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Abstract 
 
In the paper we describe in detail how to build linked CGE-microsimulation models (using fictitious 
data) following three main approaches: one in accordance with the fully integrated approach and the 
other two according to the layered approach – the so-called Top-Down and Top-Down/Bottom-Up ap-
proaches. After this, we implement the same policy reform in each of the three models. Results show 
that all three approaches yield different results especially in terms of income distribution and poverty, 
although analysed within the same economy and under the same policy simulation. We then analyse in 
more detail the TD/BU approach as developed by Savard (2003) and, in order to avoid possible devia-
tions due to data inconsistencies, we propose an alternative way of taking into account feedback effects 
from the micro level of analysis into the CGE model. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Literatur zu Ungleichheit und Armut verknüpft immer häufi-
ger makroökonomische berechenbare allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle (CGE-Modelle) und 
Mikrosimulationsmodelle, die auf Individualdaten beruhen. Die Verknüpfung dieser beiden 
Modellwelten macht es möglich, aus politischen Reformen oder ökonomischen Schocks resul-
tierende Veränderungen der Einkommensverteilung für heterogene Agenten unter Einbezie-
hung gesamtwirtschaftlicher Rückkopplungseffekte zu analysieren. 
 
Dieser Aufsatz vergleicht die Güte dreier konkurrierender Ansätze zur Verknüpfung der Mik-
ro- und Makroebene. Der erste Ansatz ist ein so genanntes integriertes Modell, bei dem die 
verfügbaren mikroökonomischen Daten unmittelbar in ein CGE-Modell eingespeist werden. 
Die beiden anderen Ansätze sind geschichtete Modelle, bei denen makro- und mikroökonomi-
sche Modellierung separat erfolgen und die Verknüpfung zwischen beiden Modellwelten 
durch Übergabe einiger ausgewählter Parameter erfolgt. Der Top-Down-Ansatz verknüpft ein 
verhaltensbasiertes Mikrosimulationsmodell mit dem CGE-Modell über ein spezifisches Glei-
chungssystem, das Variablen bzw. Parameter wie Preise und Beschäftigung von der Makro- 
zur Mikroebene übergibt. Das Top-Down/Bottom-Up-Modell geht weiter, indem zusätzlich 
Feedback-Effekte von der Mikro- an die Makroebene berücksichtigt werden. 
 
Um die Leistungsfähigkeit dieser Ansätze zu analysieren, wird für jedes Modell dieselbe wirt-
schaftspolitische Reform anhand der Mikro- und Makrodaten für eine hypothetische Ökono-
mie simuliert. An diesem Beispiel zeigt sich, dass die drei Modellansätze zu markant unter-
schiedlichen Ergebnissen führen können. Angesichts der bestehenden Vielfalt der möglichen 
berechenbaren Mikro-Makro-Modelle sind bei Simulationen daher Robustheitschecks unbe-
dingt erforderlich. Im Einzelnen zeigt sich: Das integrierte Modell liefert tendenziell ungenau-
ere Ergebnisse für die Armuts- und Ungleichheitsmaße als die geschichteten Modelle. Die Re-
sultate im Top-Down/Bottom-Up-Modell reagieren sensibel auf die Variablen, die für die 
Übergabe von der Mikro- zur Makroebene genutzt werden, und auf Inkonsistenzen der ver-
fügbaren mikro- und makroökonomischen Daten. Wie das Papier zeigt, können die Verzer-
rungen durch Dateninkonsistenzen im Top-Down/Bottom-Up-Modell verringert werden, wenn 
die Variablen bzw. Parameter, die von der Mikro- an die Makroebene übergeben werden, in 
Veränderungen und nicht in Niveaus ausgedrückt werden. 
Non-technical summary 
 
The economic literature on the topic of poverty and inequality has increasingly been linking 
macroeconomic computable general equilibrium models (CGE models) to microsimulation 
models based on individual data. Linking these two models allows for an analysis of hetero-
geneous agents which also takes into account the macroeconomic effects resulting from politi-
cal reforms or economic shocks. 
 
This paper rates three competing approaches to linking the micro with the macro level of 
analysis. The first approach is a so-called integrated model which feeds the available micro-
economic data directly into a CGE model. The remaining two models are layered models, in 
which the macro- and microeconomic models are shaped separately and then linked by pass-
ing certain selected parameters from one level of analysis to the other.  The Top-Down ap-
proach links a behavioural microsimulation model with the CGE model via a specific system 
of equations, which passes variables or parameters (such as price and occupation) from the 
macro- to the microsimulation model. The Top-Down/Bottom-Up model goes even further 
and takes into account the feedback effects from the micro- to the macro level of analysis. 
 
In order to analyse the efficiency of these approaches, we simulate an identical economic 
shock with each model by using the micro- and macro-data for a hypothetical economy. This 
example shows that the three approaches can lead to distinctly different results. In the light of 
the existing diversity of possible computable micro-macro-models, simulations are essential 
for robustness checks. A closer look shows us that the integrated model tends to provide less 
accurate results for the poverty and inequality measures in comparison to the layered models. 
The results of the Top-Down/Bottom-Up model are sensitive to the variables used to commu-
nicate the feedback effects from the micro- to the macro level of analysis. Moreover, results 
are also affected by inconsistencies in the available micro- and macroeconomic data.  As this 
paper shows, using variable or parameter changes instead of variable or parameter levels when 
passing from the micro- to the macro level can reduce deviations caused by data inconsisten-
cies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the pioneering work by Adelman and Robinson (1978) for South Korea and Lysy and 
Taylor (1980) for Brazil, many Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models for develop-
ing countries combine a highly disaggregated representation of the economy within a consis-
tent macroeconomic framework and a description of the distribution of income through a 
small number of representative households (RHs). 
However, in order to account for heterogeneity among the main sources of the changes in 
household income, several “representative households” are necessary. Despite this need for 
variety, the number of RHs is generally small in these models (usually less than 10). 
Usually, the level of disaggregation depends critically on the questions that the model is ex-
pected to answer: the household account is broken down into a number of relatively homoge-
neous household groups to reflect the socioeconomic characteristics of the country or region 
under consideration. The degree of homogeneity is essential in the design of classifications, 
and especially in the classification of household groups, where one would like to identify 
groups that are relatively homogeneous in terms of income sources and levels, and expendi-
ture patterns, and that may be able to reproduce the socioeconomic and structural stratification 
observed within the society and the economy under study. It is noteworthy anyway that a 
household classification based on income or expenditure brackets does not satisfy any of these 
requirements – except perhaps the last one. Indeed, consider for instance the poorest segment 
of the society (say the bottom decile of the income pyramid): it may include very different 
household heads, such as a landless agricultural worker and a urban informal sector worker, 
and policies aimed at improving conditions in the two cases are likely to be very different. 
The CGE/RH framework sometimes also explicitly considers that households within a RH 
group are heterogeneous in a “constant” way. That is, in order to capture within-group ine-
quality, it is assumed that the distribution of relative income within each RH follows an ex-
ogenous statistical law1. But the assumption that relative incomes are constant within house-
hold groups is not reflected in reality. Indeed, empirical analyses conducted on household sur-
veys show that the within-group component of observed changes in income distribution is 
                                                 
1 For early applications of this type of models, see Adelman and Robinson (1978), and Dervis et al. (1982), who 
specified lognormal within-group distributions with exogenous variances. More recent examples of this kind of 
models can be found in Decaluwé et al. (1999a), Colatei and Round (2000) and Agénor et al. (2001). 
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generally at least as important as the between-group component of these changes2. Thus, the 
RH approach based on this assumption may be misleading in several circumstances, and this 
is especially true when studying poverty. This argument may be better understood by present-
ing an example: consider a shock which increases the world price of a specific commodity, 
say maize, and reduces the world demand for this good. Under the small country assumption 
(that is, the country is price-taking on the world market), and assuming a demand elasticity 
with respect to price that is less than one in modulus, a country exporting this good will see a 
decrease in its exports and a domestic contraction of this sector. After the simulation of the 
shock with a CGE/RH model, suppose that we find a little change in the mean income of a RH 
group, say workers in the agricultural sector. In this case, poverty might be increasing by 
much more than suggested by this drop in income: indeed, in some households there may be 
individuals that lose their job after the shock, or that encounter more difficulties to diversify 
their activity or their consumption than others. For these individuals or families, the relative 
fall in income is necessarily larger than for the whole group, and this fall in their income is not 
represented by the slight fall in the mean income of the whole group. Suppose moreover that 
the initial income of these individual was low. Then poverty may be increasing by much more 
than what predicted by a simple RH model, which is based on the assumption of distribution 
neutral shocks. So, the RH approach does not capture the effects that a shock or a policy 
change may have on single individuals or households. 
As it is well emphasized in Savard (2003), another significant drawback in linking the intra-
group distribution change to a statistical law that is completely exogenous is that no economic 
behaviour is considered behind this change in within-group distribution3. 
                                                 
2 After Mookherjee and Shorrocks’ (1982) study of UK, there are now other examples of “within/between” de-
composition analysis of changes in inequality that indicate that changes in overall inequality are usually due at 
least as much to changes in within-group inequality as to changes in the between-group component. Among the 
applications to developing countries, see Ahuja et al. (1997), who applied this decomposition analysis to the case 
of Thailand, and Ferreira and Litchfield (2001) for Brazil. 
3 The intra-group distribution change is usually linked to a theoretical statistical relationship between average and 
variance of the lognormal distribution. Savard (2003) also underlines the fact that the average behaviour of a spe-
cific group is biased towards the richest in the group. Standard CGE models, indeed, use household groupings 
that take into account the total income and expenditure of each group and the behavioural parameters which are 
generally calibrated at the base year. In most of the models these parameters reflect the aggregate and not neces-
sarily the average behaviour. Thus, as the richest of a group are endowed with most of the factors, their behav-
iour will be dominant in the group. Moreover, keeping in mind that when doing poverty analysis is very impor-
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In order to overcome these problems, the recent literature has tried to develop new modelling 
tools which should be able at the same time to account for heterogeneity and for the possible 
general equilibrium effects of the policy reform (or the exogenous shock) under study. In view 
of the fact that most of the available economic models have either a microeconomic or a mac-
roeconomic focus, and they do not address the question adequately, the recent literature has 
focused on the possibility of combining two different types of models. Most of the economic 
policies (structural adjustment programs or trade liberalizations, for example) and of the ex-
ogenous shocks commonly analyzed for developing countries (such as fluctuations in the 
world price of raw materials and agricultural exports) are often macroeconomic phenomena 
(or may have, at least, some structural effects on the economy), while poverty and inequality 
are mainly microeconomic issues. Thus, an approach that takes into account these important 
micro-macro linkages, seems to be the right answer to the problem. In particular, some authors 
have tried to link microsimulation models to CGE models4, in order to account simultaneously 
for structural changes, for general equilibrium effects of the economic policies, and for their 
impacts on households’ welfare, income distribution and poverty. The literature that follows 
this approach is quite flourishing in recent years: there are, among others, the important con-
tributions by Decaluwé et al. (1999a) and (1999b), Cogneau and Robilliard (2001 and 2004), 
Cockburn (2001), Cogneau (2001), Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003b), Boccan-
fuso et al. (2003) and Savard (2003). 
 
The aim of the paper is to give an assessment of recent developments in this field, with a spe-
cial concern for the different types of linking that are currently used in the literature. 
In particular, we will link the microdata from a survey to a CGE model in three different 
ways: through a full integration of the survey data into a CGE framework, as it is done for in-
stance in Cockburn (2001); by linking a behavioural microsimulation model to a CGE through 
a set of specific equations, which is the so called Top-Down method, as it is developed in 
Bourguignon et al. (2003b), and finally through a method which was developed by Savard 
(2003), also known as Top-Down/Bottom-Up (TD/BU) model. 
We will build all the three types of models using the same data from a fictitious economy. Af-
ter this, by running an identical policy reform in the three models, we will analyse the differ-
                                                                                                                                                         
tant to consider the behaviour around the poverty line, nothing really demonstrates that the average of aggregated 
behaviour will be representative of the households around the poverty line. 
4 More generally, this current of the literature develops the use of micro-data drawn from household surveys in 
the context of a general equilibrium setting, which is usually but not necessarily a CGE model. 
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ent outcomes deriving from different types of linking. The choice for the use of fictitious data 
describing a simple economy is made with the aim of being able to understand better the dif-
ferences that are observed in the results of the models, and to try to “go behind” these differ-
ences and look for the causes that generate them. Of course, this is of more difficult realization 
when using true data of a real and thus more complex economy, which naturally shows more a 
complex structure in its economic relationships. 
Finally, we will analyse in more detail the TD/BU approach as developed by Savard (2003) 
and propose an alternative way of taking into account feedback effects from the micro level of 
analysis into the CGE model. 
 
 
 
2. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
The main intuition behind this approach is to simply substitute the Representative Household 
Groups inside a standard CGE model with the real households that are found in the survey5. 
This way, one passes from a model with, for instance, ten representative agents to a model 
with thousands of agents, thus increasing the computational effort, but leaving substantially 
unchanged the modelling hypothesis of a standard CGE model. Basically, this approach does 
not include a true microsimulation module in the modelling framework, but it tries to incorpo-
rate the data from the household survey into the CGE model. 
The first step to build such a model is to pass from the representative households’ data of the 
survey to population values; to do this, one should weight each variable at the household level 
with the weights usually given in the survey, thus obtaining population values for each vari-
able. 
After this, we need a procedure to reconcile these population data coming from the survey (in-
comes and expenditures) with the accounts contained in the social accounting matrix (SAM). 
The literature on data reconciliation offers different alternatives. One may choose to keep 
fixed the structure of the SAM and adjust the household survey, or otherwise to adjust the 
SAM in order to meet the totals of the household survey. Another alternative would be that of 
                                                 
5 The first attempt in this direction was made by Decaluwé et al. (1999b). Among the models following this ap-
proach there are the works by Cockburn (2001) for Nepal, by Boccanfuso et al. (2003) for Senegal, and by Coro-
raton and Cockburn (2005), who studied the case of Philippine economy. 
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using an intermediate approach. Whatever the method used, however, one necessarily loses 
the structure of the original data, which is one of the main drawbacks of the integrated ap-
proach. Our choice was for the first alternative, and we kept the original composition of 
households’ incomes and expenditures unchanged. 
After these changes in the SAM, one encounters the problem of re-balancing it (row totals 
must be equal to column totals). To do this, we used an appropriate program that minimizes 
least squares6. 
The CGE model is the one described in section 3.2, except for the fact that we have added an 
index which refers to households7. 
A thing should be noted at this point: certain types of equations that are commonly included in 
a behavioural model, such as occupational choice equations, are not easily modelled within 
standard CGE modelling softwares8, so that CGE-MS that follow the fully integrated ap-
proach are not always able to capture the behavioural responses of the agents to the policy re-
forms that are implemented. Instead, micro-econometric behavioural modelling provides 
much more flexibility in terms of the modelling structure used, and is more suitable to de-
scribe the complexity of household and individual behaviour, and the way this may be af-
fected by the changes in the macroeconomic framework that are subsequent to a policy reform 
or an external shock. 
The main point here is that with a CGE model like the one used for the integrated approach we 
are not able to predict which particular individual will enjoy the reduction (or will suffer from 
the rise) in the employment level on the basis of some characteristics of the individual or of 
the household that can be observed; this instead can be done through a behavioural mi-
crosimulation model. 
Indeed, the main feature that differentiates a microsimulation model from a standard CGE 
framework (not only one with representative agents, but even one with thousands of house-
holds from a survey, as we have seen) is that it works at the individual level, selecting those 
                                                 
6 There exist different principles on which SAM-balancing programs can be based, such as the “Row and Sum” 
or RAS method (see Bacharach, 1971), least squares minimization principles, known also as Stone-Byron meth-
ods (see Stone (1977) and Byron (1978)), or the more recent cross-entropy approach proposed by Robinson et al. 
(2001) and Robilliard and Robinson (2003). 
mmqmqq CBUDHCP ⋅=⋅ α7 For example, the consumption demand function in Appendix A becomes: , 
where m is now the index for households. 
8 To this regard, see Savard’s (2003) discussion about the limits and advantages of the various approaches of 
linking. 
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individuals that show the highest probability of changing their labour market status, on the ba-
sis of their personal or family characteristics. This fact could bring above significant differ-
ences in the results between the two types of models, even after the same policy simulation, as 
we will see below. 
 
 
 
3. THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH 
 
We apply now the sequential or Top-Down approach as described in Bourguignon et al. 
(2003b). 
The basic idea is to develop separately a MS model and then to run the simulation on the basis 
of changes in consumer/producer prices, wages, and sectoral employment levels as predicted 
by the CGE model. This approach thus uses the two frameworks in a sequential way: first, the 
policy reform is simulated with the CGE model, and the second step consists of passing the 
simulated changes in some variables such as prices, wage rates, and employment levels9 down 
to the MS module, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CGE model 
Input 
A vector of changes in: 
- Prices, wage rates and interest rates 
- Quantities (for ex. occupational levels) 
MS 
model 
New income levels 
after simulation 
Output 
Output 
 
Figure 1 – The Top-Down Approach 
                                                 
9 When the assumption of imperfect labour market is adopted, or when the presence of a formal and an informal 
sector is predicted, the rationing in the labour market is usually carried out in the macro or CGE model, while the 
main use of the MS module is to select those households or individuals who will actually be barred out of, or let 
in, employment, or the formal sector. We will see this in more detail in the simulation section. 
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3.1. The Microsimulation Module 
 
The main role of the microsimulation module in the linked framework is to provide a detailed 
computation of net incomes at the household level, through a detailed description of the tax-
benefit system of the economy, and to estimate individual behavioural responses to the policy 
change. For instance, through the use of microeconometric equations, we can model behav-
iours such as labour supply or consumption. 
Behavioural Microsimulation (MS) models are developed to capture the possible reactions of 
the agents to the simulated policies, so that what happens after a reform can be very different 
from what is predicted by the simple arithmetical computations included in an accounting 
model. 
In this section we will describe in detail a simple behavioural model, following quite closely 
the discrete labour supply choice model used in Bourguignon et al. (2003b). Another descrip-
tion of a similar MS model for labour supply can be found in Bussolo and Lay (2003) with 
their model for Colombia, and in Hérault (2005), who built a model for the South African 
economy. 
For the building of the model we will use fictitious data describing a very simple economy. In 
the household survey we have information about some individual characteristics, such as age, 
sex, level of qualification, education, labour and capital income, the eventual receipt of public 
transfers, and the activity status. For the sake of simplicity, we have stated that each individual 
at working age (16-64) can choose between only two alternatives: being a full-time wage 
worker, or being unoccupied. There are other variables in the survey that are referred to 
households rather than to individuals, for example the area of residence, the number of house-
hold components, the number of adults (over 18 years old) and children (under 18), and so on. 
All consumption goods of the economy are grouped in two main categories10. 
We derive income variables referring to households from initial individual data by summing 
up individual values for each household member; this way, we obtain households’ labour and 
capital incomes, households’ public transfers and households’ total income: 
                                                 
10 The focus of our distribution and poverty analysis will be on disposable income, even if an inequality and pov-
erty analysis could also be conducted on expenditure rather than on income levels. 
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where YLmi is labour income of individual i member of household m, YKmi his/her capital in-
come, and TFmi are the public transfers he/she receives from government. All these quantities 
are summed up for each family over all the individuals belonging to the family (NCm is the 
number of components of household m); then, household m’s total income, Ym, is the sum of 
all incomes received by the family: labour income, capital income, and public transfers. 
For the benchmark situation, we assume all initial prices normalized at one. 
Household m’s labour income: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim YLYL
1
 
Household m’s capital income: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim YKYK
1
 
Public transfers to household m: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim TFTF
1
 
Household m’s total income: mmmm TFYKYLY ++=
 
 
The Model 
The core of the behavioural model is represented by the following two equations: 
 
( ) mimimimi vcxbaYLLog +⋅+⋅+= λ  (B.1)Regression model for log-wage earnings: 
Choice of labour market status: [ ]0>+⋅+⋅+= mimimimi rwzIndW εγβα  (B.2)
 
The rest of the MS module is made up by simple arithmetical computations of price indices, 
incomes, savings and consumption levels. As the parameters entering the following equations 
(marginal propensity to save , income tax rates γ, and budget shares mmps mqη ) are constant, 
this part of the model may be regarded as purely accounting, as it does not contain any possi-
ble behavioural response to policy simulations. 
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 Household m’s income generation model: mm
NC
i
mimim TFYKWYLY
m ++⋅= ∑
=1
 (B.3)
Household disposable (after tax) income: ( ) mm YYD ⋅−= γ1  (B.4)
Household specific consumer price index: ∑
=
⋅=
2
1q
qmqm PCPI η  (B.5)
Real disposable income: mmm CPIYDYDR /=  (B.6)
Savings: mmm YDmpsS ⋅=  (B.7)
Household consumption budget: mmm SYDCEBUD −=  (B.8)
Consumption expenditure for commodity q: mmqmq CEBUDCE ⋅=η  (B.9)
q
mq
mq P
CE
C =  (B.10)Consumption level of commodity q: 
Household m’s capital income: mm KSPKYK ⋅=  (B.11)
 
Description of the subscripts: 
m Households m = 1, 2, …, 24  
i NCm: number of components of household m Individuals belonging to household m   i = 1, …, NCm
q q = 1,2 Goods  
 
 
The first equation of the model, (B.1), computes the logarithm of labour income (wage) of 
member i of household m as a linear function of his/her personal characteristics (vector  
includes the logarithm of age, sex, skill level and educational attainment) and of 
mix
miλ , which 
represents the inverse Mills ratio estimated for the selection model (for more details on the es-
timation process see below). The residual term  describes the effects of unobserved com-
ponents on wage earnings. 
miv
The second equation represents the choice of the labour status made by household members11. 
Each individual at working age has to choose between two alternatives: being a wage worker, 
                                                 
11 In the literature this kind of equation is known as occupational choice model, or selection model (and also dis-
crete choice model of labour supply). However, it must be specified that this equation is not really intended to 
explain the individual choice between being occupied or unemployed, but rather it tries to find out which charac-
teristics strengthen the probability of being in one condition rather than in the other one for each individual, as it 
is described in more detail in the estimation section below. 
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or being inactive. The variable  is a dichotomic variable taking value one if individual i of 
household m decides to be a wage worker, and zero otherwise. The choice is made by each in-
dividual according to some criterion, the value of which is specific to the alternative, and the 
alternative with the highest criterion value is selected. A natural economic interpretation of 
this criterion value is utility: each individual chooses the alternative with the highest associ-
ated utility. Indeed, we will estimate the selection model using a binomial logit specification, 
which assigns each individual to the alternative with the highest associated probability. In our 
model we have arbitrarily set to zero the utility of being inactive. Function “Ind” is an indica-
tor function taking value one if the condition is verified, and zero otherwise. Vector  of ex-
planatory variables includes some personal characteristics of individual i of household m, that 
is: age, sex, skill and educational level, the area of residence and the number of children under 
6 living in the household. Variable rw
miW
miz
mi is the logarithm of real labour income. The equation is 
defined only for individuals at working age. 
The third equation is an accounting identity that defines total household income, Ym, as the 
sum of the wage income of its members YLmi, of the exogenous household capital income 
YKm, and of the total amount of public transfers received by household m, TFm. In this equa-
tion, variable Wmi stands for a dummy variable that takes value one if member i is a wage 
worker and zero otherwise. 
The fourth equation computes household disposable (after tax) income by applying income 
tax rates according to the rule reported in Table 1. In order to simplify computations, we have 
assumed that in this economy direct income taxes are imposed on households’ total income 
Ym, and not on individual incomes. 
 
Table 1 – Direct Income Tax Rates 
Income brackets: Tax rate
Up to 10,000 0%
Up to 15,000 15%
Up to 26,000 24%
Up to 70,000 32%
Over 70,000 39%
 
 
Equation (B.5) computes an household specific consumer price index through the consump-
tion shares mqη . Real disposable income is then obtained by dividing households’ disposable 
income by this index (equation (B.6)). 
 11
Then, to find out household m’s savings level, equation (B.7) multiplies this disposable in-
come by the marginal propensity to save of each household, . The assumption underly-
ing this equation is that household savings behaviour is unvarying, as the savings level is a 
fixed fraction of household disposable income. Then, subtracting savings from disposable in-
come one obtains the budget that each household spends for consumption (
mmps
equation (B.8)), 
which is spent on the two goods of the model according to the budget shares mqη  by equation 
(B.9). Again, the assumption in this equation is that consumption behaviour is not flexible, 
that is, households spend a constant fraction of their consumption budget for each of the two 
goods. 
To get the values of these exogenous parameters (marginal propensity to save  and 
budget shares 
mmps
mqη ), we use the initial data from the survey in the following way: 
m
m
m YD
Smps =  Household m’s marginal propensity to save: 
Household m’s consumption budget shares: 
m
mq
mq CEBUD
CE=η
 
Equation (B.10) derives then the consumption levels for each household by dividing the ex-
penditure for each good by its price. 
Finally, income from capital is obtained by multiplying capital endowment of each family, 
KSm, by the return to capital, PK (equation (B.11)). 
The initial values of the variables Cmq and KSm (consumption levels and capital endowments, 
respectively) are derived from the initial data of the survey by making use of the assumption 
that in the benchmark situation all prices and returns are equal to one: 
 
Household m’s consumption level of commodity 
q: mqmq
CEC =  (B.12)
mm YKKS =  (B.13)Household m’s capital endowment: 
 
Moreover, we assume that public transfers paid to households and household capital endow-
ments are exogenously given. They are fixed at the level reported in the survey, for public 
transfers, and at the level as computed in equation (B.13), for capital endowment, respectively. 
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Estimation of the Model 
The only two equations in the MS module that need to be estimated are equations (B.1) and 
(B.2). 
The former, which expresses the logarithm of wage earnings as a linear function of some indi-
vidual characteristics and of λmi, the inverse Mills ratio, was estimated using a Heckman two-
step model (see Heckman (1976) and (1979)). We follow this approach to correct for the se-
lection bias which is implicit in a wage regression, that is, the fact that we observe a positive 
wage only for those individuals that are actually employed at the moment of the survey. 
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 2 below. The estimation was conducted on 
the sub-sample of individuals at working age (16-64). 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Heckman selection model, two-step estimates    
Dependent variable: logarithm of wage  
 Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
constant 7.032117 0.3145104 22.36 0.000 
ln(age) 0.697818 0.0833084 8.38 0.000 
sex -0.466210 0.1018222 -4.58 0.000 
qualification 0.396613 0.0771516 5.14 0.000 
education 0.525011 0.0871646 6.02 0.000 
Mills ratio 0.216005 0.1473164 1.47 0.143 
Selection     
ln(age) 0.338583 0.0807227 4.19 0.000 
sex -1.549158 0.2802896 -5.53 0.000 
qualification 1.020388 0.2728658 3.74 0.000 
children under 6 0.168214 0.2368365 0.71 0.478 
region -0.751549 0.2980307 -2.52 0.012 
rho 0.762760    
sigma 0.283187    
 
 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients for the wage equation thus follows that of a simple linear 
regression. As we can observe in Table 2, age, schooling and skill level have a positive effect 
on the wage, while being a woman shows a negative effect. 
It is important to say that the aim of the wage equation within the model is that of obtaining an 
efficient estimate for an eventual wage income only for those individuals that are observed to 
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be inactive in the survey, in the case that, after a policy reform, one or more of them will 
change their labour market status and become wage workers. In this case, through these esti-
mates, we will be able to assign an estimated wage to the individual that has changed his/her 
labour market status after the simulation run. 
For all the other individuals that are observed to receive a wage in the survey, we use instead 
the observed wage level and not the estimated one. 
 
Parameters of equation (B.2) were obtained through the estimation of a binomial logit model, 
assuming that the residual terms iε  are distributed according to the Extreme Value Distribu-
tion – Type I12. The estimation was conducted on the sub-sample of individuals at working 
age (16-64). 
Our explanatory variables include individual characteristics such as the logarithm of predicted 
real wage, sex, skill and education level, the region of residence and a variable accounting for 
the presence or not of children under 6 years old in the household. The model is estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood. Results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Binary logit model for labour status’ choice 
Dependent Variable: Activity Status 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
ln(real wage) 0.197215 0.046458 4.245037 0.0000 
sex -1.894812 0.407759 -4.646894 0.0000 
qualification 1.440805 0.425709 3.384482 0.0007 
region -0.718504 0.329501 -2.180586 0.0292 
children under 6 0.269124 0.297251 0.905378 0.3653 
education -0.763275 0.671696 -1.136341 0.2558 
Mean dependent var 0.664706 S.D. dependent var 0.473488 
S.E. of regression 0.376673 Akaike info criterion 0.901535 
Sum squared resid 23.26880 Schwarz criterion 1.012210 
Log likelihood -70.63049 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.946446 
Avg. Log likelihood -0.415473  
                                                 
12 The Extreme Value distribution (Type I) is also known as Gumbel (from the name of the statistician who first 
studied it) or double exponential distribution, and it is a special case of the Fisher-Tippett distribution. It can take 
two forms: one is based on the smallest extreme and the other on the largest. We will focus on the latter, which is 
the one of interest for us. The standard Gumbel distribution function (maximum) has the following probability 
and cumulative density functions, respectively: 
( )xexxf −−−= exp)(  pdf: 
( )xexF −−= exp)( . CDF: 
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A binomial model states that the probability of observing the dependent variable assuming 
value one, given the explanatory variables (OCSmi = 1|Zmi), is equal to the cumulative distribu-
tion function of iε  (the Extreme Value Type I distribution in our case), evaluated at β·Zmi, that 
is: 
[ ] ( )miZmimimi eZFZOCS ⋅−−=⋅== ββ exp)(|1Pr .      (B.14) 
The effects that the explanatory variables have on the dependent binomial variable are not lin-
ear, because they get channelled through a cumulative distribution function. Thus, by observ-
ing the values and signs of the estimated coefficients, we can say something about the effect 
that explanatory variables have on the probability that the dependent binomial variable takes 
value one (wage worker), relatively to the probability that it takes value zero, but not in a lin-
ear way. 
For instance, expected real wage and qualification seem to influence in a positive way the 
probability that the dependent variable takes value one (the more qualified the individual is, 
the higher is the probability for him/her to be employed), as well as the presence of children 
under 6 does, which is the opposite of what was expected, but anyway this result is not sig-
nificant. Moreover, for men the probability of being employed is higher than for women, as 
the variable SEX, which takes value zero for men and one for women, shows a negative coef-
ficient. The same can be said about the region of residence: people living in the first region 
have a higher probability of being employed than people living in the second one. The vari-
able referring to education, instead, seems to have a negative influence on the probability of 
being employed, which is the opposite of what we expected, and anyway it is not highly sig-
nificant. 
However, with the estimated coefficients we cannot perfectly predict the true labour market 
statuses that are actually observed in the survey. Thus, following the procedure described in 
Duncan and Weeks (1998), we drew a set of error terms iε  for each individual from the ex-
treme value distribution, in order to obtain an estimate that is consistent with the observed ac-
tivity or inactivity choices. From these drawn values, we select 100 error terms for each indi-
vidual, in such a way that, when adding it to the deterministic part of the model, it perfectly 
predicts the activity status that is observed in the survey. In other words, the residual term for 
an individual that is observed to be a wage earner in the survey should be such that: 
0ˆ6ˆˆˆˆ)(ˆˆ 654321 >+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+ mimimimmimimi SCHCHAREAQSEXRWLog εββββββα , 
while, for an individual that is observed to be inactive in the survey, the same inequality 
should be of opposite sign (≤). 
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After a policy change, only the deterministic part of the model is recomputed. Then, by adding 
the random error terms previously drawn to the recomputed deterministic component, a prob-
ability distribution over the two alternatives (being a wage worker or being inactive) is gener-
ated for each individual. This implies that the model does not assign every individual from the 
sample to one particular choice, but it gives the individual probabilities of being in one condi-
tion rather than in the other. This way, the model does not identify a particular choice for each 
individual after the policy change, but generates a probability distribution over the different 
alternatives13. 
 
 
3.2. The CGE Model 
 
The CGE model for the fictitious economy is characterized by a representative household who 
maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function with three arguments: leisure and two consump-
tion goods. These commodities are also used as inputs, together with capital and labour, in the 
production process, which is operated by two firms following a Leontief technology in the ag-
gregation of value added and the intermediate composite good, a Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution (CES) function for assembling capital and labour into value added, and a Leontief func-
tion in the aggregation of intermediate goods. Both factors of production, capital and labour, 
are mobile among sectors. The capital endowment is exogenously fixed, while labour supply 
is endogenously determined through household’s utility maximization (subject to fixed time 
endowment). The wage elasticity of labour supply is estimated from the household survey, in 
order to have consistency in labour supply behaviour between the two models. Investments are 
savings-driven, while government maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function to buy con-
sumption goods and uses labour and capital. The public sector also raises taxes on household’s 
income and tariffs on imported goods, while it pays transfers to the representative household. 
For the foreign sector we have adopted the Armington assumption of constant elasticity of 
substitution for the formation of the composite good (domestic production delivered to domes-
tic market plus imports) which is sold on the domestic market. Domestic production is par-
tially delivered to the domestic market and partially exported, according to a Constant Elastic-
ity of Transformation (CET) function. The small country hypothesis is assumed (the economy 
is price taker in the world market). 
                                                 
13 This procedure is also described in Creedy and Kalb (2005). See also Creedy et al. (2002). 
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Table 4 – SAM of the Economy 
 C1 C2 S1 S2 K L H G SI RoW Total
C1   57.5 15.5   95.2 61.2 30.3 23.5 283.3 
C2   17.1 23.5   312.8 48.5 14.2 76.5 492.5 
S1 283.3          283.3 
S2  492.5         492.5 
K   72.2 23.0    13.1   108.3 
L   83.2 353.8    116.4   553.4 
H     108.3 553.4  39.8   701.5 
G   12.3 17.7   249.0    279.0 
SI       44.5    44.5 
RoW   41.0 59.0       100.0 
Total 283.3 492.5 283.3 492.5 108.3 553.4 701.5 269.9 44.5 100.0  
 
Cq: consumption of good q; Sq: sector q; K: capital account; L: labour account; H: representative household ac-
count; G: public sector; SI: savings-investments account, RoW: Rest of the World account. 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Values of Parameters for CGE Model 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Elasticity of substitution in production function (ag-
gregation of capital and labour) 0.7 0.5 
Elasticity of substitution for Armington composite 
good 0.7 1.2 
Elasticity of transformation for exports and domestic 
production delivered to the domestic market -2.0 -3.0 
Initial tariff rates on imports 0.3 0.3 
 
Initial time endowment 656.69  
Wage elasticity of labour supply 
(estimated from the household survey) -0.18665  
 
 
 
In the model there are in total 49 variables and 41 equations, which, with the 8 exogenous 
variables (capital endowment, KS, time endowment, TS, public transfers, TF, the four world 
prices PWEq and PWMq, and the numeraire, PC), fully determine the model and allow for sat-
isfaction of Walras’ law (we have a redundant equation). 
The calibration of the parameters of the CGE model is done on the basis of a Social Account-
ing Matrix (SAM) for the economy, in such a way that the benchmark situation is consistent 
with that of the microsimulation module (for instance, in the benchmark of the two models we 
have the same average income tax rate, the same average marginal propensity to save, the 
same budget shares for consumption of the two goods, and so on). 
 17
The SAM for the economy under study and the initial values of some other variables are re-
ported in Tables 4 and 5, while the equations of the model can be found in Appendix. The data 
in the SAM are in millions of the monetary unit we have used for the survey. 
 
 
3.3. Linking the Models 
 
The basic difficulty of this approach is to ensure consistency between the micro and macro 
levels of analysis. For this reason, one may introduce a system of equations to ensure the 
achievement of consistency between the two models14. In practice, this consists in imposing 
the macro results obtained with the CGE model onto the microeconomic level of analysis. In 
particular: 
1) changes in the commodity prices, Pq, must be equal to those resulting from the CGE 
model; 
2) changes in average earnings with respect to the benchmark in the micro-simulation 
must be equal to changes in the wage rate obtained with the CGE model; 
3) changes in the return to capital of the micro-simulation module must be equal to the 
same changes observed after the simulation run in the CGE model; 
4) changes in the number of wage workers in the micro-simulation model must match 
those observed in the CGE model. 
For our model, these consistency conditions translate into the following set of constraints, 
which could be called linking equations: 
Consumption levels: ( )CGEqqq P
CE
C Δ+= 1  (M.1)
( ) ( )[ ]CGEmimi PLLYLogYLLog Δ+⋅= 1ˆLogarithm of wage earn-ings:  (M.2)( )CGEmm PKKSYK Δ+⋅= 1 (M.3)Capital income:  
CGE
m
NC
i
mi
m
NC
i
mi
EMP
WA
W
m
m
Δ=⋅
∑∑
∑∑
= =
= = 100
ˆ
24
1 1
24
1 1 (M.4) Employment level: 
                                                 
14 This way, what happens in the MS module can be made consistent with the CGE modelling by adjusting pa-
rameters in the MS model, but, from a theoretical point of view, it would be more satisfying to obtain consistency 
by modelling behaviour identically in the two models. 
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The variables with no superscripts are those coming from the microsimulation module; those 
with the ^ notation correspond to the ones that have been estimated: in particular, is 
the wage level resulting from the regression model for individual i, member of household m, 
while  is the labour market status of individual i of household m deriving from the estima-
tion of the binomial choice model. 
)ˆ( miLYLog
miWˆ
CGE
qPΔ ,  and CGEPLΔ CGEPKΔ  indicate, respectively, the change in the prices of goods, the 
change in the wage rate and in the return to capital deriving from the simulation run of the 
CGE model, while parameter CGEEMPΔ  is the employment level percentage change from the 
CGE. 
WAmi is a dummy variable taking value one if individual i of household m is at working age 
(16-64), and zero otherwise. From equation (M.4), the number of employed over the total 
number of individuals at working age resulting from the MS model must be equal to the 
change in the employment level observed after the CGE run. This implies that the CGE model 
determines the employment level of the economy after the simulation, and that the MS model 
selects which individuals among the inactive persons have the highest probability of becoming 
employed (if the employment level is increased from the CGE simulation result), or either 
who, among the wage workers, has the lowest probability of being employed after the policy 
change (if the employment level is decreased)15. 
One possible way of imposing the equality between the two sets of parameters of system of 
equations (M) is through a change in the parameters of the selection and regression models. 
Following Bourguignon et al. (2003b), we restrict this change in the parameters to a change in 
the intercept of the two functions (B.1) and (B.2). The justification for this choice is that it im-
plies neutrality of the changes, that is, changing the intercepts a of equations (B.1) just shifts 
proportionally the estimated wages of all individuals, without causing any change in the rank-
ing between one individual and the other. The same applies for the activity status choice equa-
tion: we choose to change the intercept α of equation (B.2), and this will shift proportionally 
all the individual probabilities of being a wage worker, without changing their relative posi-
tions in the probability distribution, only to let some more individuals to become employed (or 
some less if the employment rate of the CGE model is decreased), irrespectively of their per-
sonal characteristics. This change in the intercept will be of the amount that is necessary to 
reach the number of wage workers resulting from the CGE model. Thus, this choice preserves 
                                                 
15 And, in this case, his/her new wage level will be determined by the regression model of wage earnings. 
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the ranking of individuals according to their ex-ante probability of being employed, which was 
previously determined by the estimation of the binomial model. For this reason the change in 
the intercept parameter satisfies this neutrality property. 
 
 
 
4. THE TOP-DOWN/BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
 
This approach was developed by Savard (2003). It allows overcoming the problem of the lack 
of consistency between the micro and macro levels of the Top-Down approach by introducing 
a bi-directional link between the two models: this is the reason why this approach is also 
called “Top-Down/Bottom-Up”. According to this method, indeed, aggregate results from the 
MS model (such as consumption levels and/or labour supply) are incorporated into the CGE 
model, and a loop is used to run both models iteratively until the two produce convergent re-
sults. 
The value added of this approach is that it takes into account the feedback effects that come 
from the micro level of analysis, which are instead completely disregarded by the Top-Down 
model. The basic assumption behind this approach is that the microeconomic effects provided 
by the MS model run do not correspond to the aggregate behaviours of the representative 
households used in the CGE model, and that it is thus necessary to take these effects back into 
the CGE model to fully account for the effects of a simulated policy. A stylized scheme of the 
way in which this approach works can be observed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – The Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach 
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The bilateral communication between the two levels of analysis is achieved through a set of 
vectors of changes, as in the Top-Down approach: from the macro to the micro level of analy-
sis the communication is guaranteed by the changes in the price, wage and return vector and in 
the employment levels, as before, while from the micro to the macro level the communication 
we apply two different strategies: in one version, we will use as input for the CGE model a 
vector of changes in the aggregate consumption and in the labour supply levels from the MS 
model16; in another version of the same model, only the change in the labour supply level 
which results from the MS model will be used as input for the CGE model17. The process is 
then iterated as many times as it is necessary to come to a convergent point, that is, when con-
vergence (at a certain number of decimals) is obtained in the aggregate variable levels of the 
two models. 
 
 
 
5. SIMULATION 
 
We will now run a policy simulation with each of the three models. The simulation will be an 
exogenous shock on the world price level of the good exported by sector 2, which is the labour 
intensive sector in our stylized economy. The world price of good 2 is reduced of 64 % from 
its initial value. 
                                                 
16 The choice for consumption and labour supply as communicating variables is made following Savard (2003). 
However, as both consumption and labour supply are not exogenous in the CGE model, we have to change some 
of the initial hypothesis of the model. First, we remove the equations determining consumption demand by the 
representative household (equation C.1 in Appendix A), substituting them with the following single equation: 
. In the initial hypothesis (endogenous consumption) we had 2 endogenous variables (C∑
=
⋅=
2
1i
ii CPCBUD i) and 
2 equations. Now we have 2 exogenous variables and one equation. As we need to insure the balancing of the 
household’s budget constraint, a variable needs now to be endogenized in the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )TFPCLSPLKSPKtympsCBUD ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅−⋅−= 11 . Following Savard, we choose to endogenize the mar-
ginal propensity to save, mps, which is now a variable that changes in order to satisfy the budget constraint. 
In addition, we introduce an exogenous level of labour supply into the CGE model, and just leave out the equa-
tion that determines the demand for leisure (equation C.2 in Appendix A). This way, equation C.3 will now yield 
the demand for leisure as the time remaining after having supplied an exogenous level of labour. 
17 In this case, we only introduce an exogenous level of labour supply into the CGE model, just leaving out the 
equation that determines the demand for leisure (equation C.2 in Appendix A). 
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The simulation results for the most relevant macroeconomic variables are reported in percent-
age changes in Tables 6 and 7. In the table, also the two different strategies adopted for the 
TD/BU approach are taken into account, so that we will compare the results coming from the 
introduction into the CGE model of, respectively, the consumption level and the labour supply 
coming from the microsimulation module, and only the labour supply. 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Simulation Results: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
Integrated 
Approach 
Top-Down 
Approach 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Government Surplus 
-14.87 -14.67 -14.42 -14. 64 Wage Rate 
19.70 19.30 17.91 19.13 Capital return 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Consumer Price Index (num.) 
53.83 53.76 53.83 53.70 Exchange rate 
-1.00 -1.18 -1.32 -1.32 Labour Supply 
4.82 4.23 3.72 4.06 Government Use of Labour 
-25.45 -25.45 -24.72 -25.43 Government Use of Capital 
-9.50 -9.39 -9.50 -9.48 Income* 
-9.50 -9.39 -9.50 -9.48 Disposable Income* 
-9.50 -9.39 -7.90 -9.48 Consumption Expenditure* 
0.00 0.00 -16.22 0.00 Marginal Propensity to Save 
-9.28 -9.39 -24.18 -9.48 Savings* 
-9.28 -9.48 -9.63 -9.58 Tax Revenues 
 
* For the integrated model, these changes are computed as average percentage changes across households. 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Simulation Results: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
Integrated Ap-
proach 
Top-Down Ap-
proach 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply)  
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 
-0.99 0.30 -1.23 0.38 -1.70 0.52 -1.27 0.39Commodity Prices 
-8.69 -12.52 -8.81 -12.54 -10.21 -12.05 -8.88 -12.64Domestic Sales 
27.81 -14.20 27.91 -14.31 26.77 -13.86 27.84 -14.43Domestic Production 
43.52 -13.22 43.05 -13.36 41.08 -12.94 42.88 -13.48Labour Demand 
13.07 -26.82 13.14 -26.72 12.72 -25.84 13.15 -26.76Capital Demand 
-8.60 -9.78 -8.26 -9.73 -6.58 -8.30 -8.32 -9.84Consumption* 
-7.65 -8.84 -8.26 -9.73 -22.87 -24.57 -8.32 -9.84Investments 
-32.92 -47.63 -33.11 -47.57 -34.37 -47.21 -33.16 -47.60Imports 
207.36 -78.38 209.23 -78.53 209.10 -78.48 209.11 -78.59Exports 
 
* For the integrated model, these percentage changes are computed as average percentage changes across households. 
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In general, we can say that we have very similar results for most of the macro variables in all 
the four simulations. The shock has negative effects on the economy. Indeed, as we can ob-
serve in Table 6, the fall in the price of the exported good for sector 2 causes a reduction of 
the production level for this sector, which reduces its demand for both factors of production. 
However, due to the depreciation of local currency, the reduction in the local price of the ex-
ported good is lower than the 64% world price reduction. For the same reason, exports for the 
other production sector become convenient, so that for this sector we observe an increase in 
the level of the exported good, an increase in the production level, and in the demand for capi-
tal and labour. The depreciation of local currency has a negative effect on the level of imports, 
which contributes to a decrease of the amount of goods sold on the domestic market. 
The lower level of labour demand as a whole (the second sector is labour-intensive, as can be 
observed in the SAM, Table 4) generates a reduction in the wage rate, which causes a decrease 
in labour supply. The opposite is observed for capital, as the first sector is more capital-
intensive. As a consequence of the change in the price of the factors, government increases its 
demand for labour input and decreases the demand for capital, as the latter has become rela-
tively more expensive. 
As the income of the representative household is based chiefly on the supply of labour, we ob-
serve a reduction in nominal income and, as a consequence, of savings and consumption ex-
penditure. The amount of consumption goods always decrease, but the percentage change var-
ies according to the change in their relative price: the commodity produced by the second sec-
tor has become relatively more expensive, due to the negative shock that hit the sector. 
As investments are savings-driven, we observe also a reduction in the demand for investment 
goods (again, the investment good produced by the second sector is now relatively more ex-
pensive, so we observe a higher reduction for the demand of this good). 
 
However, a particular result needs further explanations: savings and investments in the 
TD/BU-C&LS model decrease much more than in the other three models. The reason for this 
lays in the fact that, in order to be able to introduce exogenous consumption levels into the 
CGE model, we must endogenize one variable in the households’ budget constraint to keep 
the equilibrium in this constraint. Savard’s choice is for the marginal propensity to save, and 
we follow his approach. But the consequence of this will be a change in the household behav-
iour with respect to the initial assumptions made for the benchmark. Indeed, the marginal pro-
pensity to save of the household will decrease, and thus also households’ savings. As in our 
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model investments are savings-driven, this will generate a further reduction of investments. 
We will analyse this aspect further in the next subsection (5.1). 
 
With respect to the microeconomic results, and mainly the changes in poverty and inequality, 
we can observe in Table 8 and 9 that the differences are generally significant only for the case 
of the integrated model. 
The underlying variable for the computation of the indices is per-capita real disposable in-
come, obtained by dividing disposable income by the household specific consumer price in-
dex18, and then dividing it again by the number of adult equivalents resulting by the “Oxford” 
or “Old OECD” scale (see OECD, 1982). This equivalence scale calculates the number of 
adult equivalents living in a household by assigning a value of 1 to the first household mem-
ber, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child: 
AE = 1 + 0.7⋅(#Adults – 1) + 0.5⋅(#Children). 
 
 
Table 8 – Inequality Indices on Disposable per Adult Equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 TD/BU 
Approach 
(C & LS)* 
TD/BU 
Approach 
(LS)* 
Benchmark 
Values 
Integrated 
Approach* 
Top-Down 
Approach* 
33.96 2.81% 1.62% 1.47% 1.60% Gini Index 
9.60 4.51% 2.73% 2.48% 2.70% Atkinson’s Index, ε = 0.5 
71.80 3.13% 2.29% 2.14% 2.27% Coefficient of Variation 
     Generalized Entropy Measures: 
25.78 6.36% 4.64% 4.32% 4.60% I(c), c = 2 
19.93 3.85% 2.05% 1.81% 2.02% Mean Logarithmic Deviation, I(0) 
20.55 5.17% 3.38% 3.11% 3.34% Theil Coefficient, I(1) 
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
First of all, we observe that the Top-Down and the TD/BU-Labour Supply approach show al-
most identical results for what concerns both poverty and inequality indices. 
The TD/BU-C&LS model we observe a smaller effect on inequality, but in the same direction 
as for the other two models, and the same is true for poverty. 
                                                 
18 The household specific price index is computed using households’ consumption shares and the change in 
prices deriving from the CGE model, as follows:   . ( )∑
=
Δ+⋅=
2
1
1
q
CGE
qmqm PCPI η
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The biggest difference in the microeconomic results is to be detected in the integrated ap-
proach, where we observe a higher increase both in the inequality and poverty indices. The in-
crease in inequality for the integrated approach is also confirmed by the higher level of the 
Severity of Poverty Index, which measures the degree of inequality among the poor, while a 
higher Poverty Gap Index indicates that the gap between the income of the poor and the pov-
erty line has increased (see Appendix B for more details on poverty indices). 
 
 
Table 9 – Poverty Indices on Disposable per Adult equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
TD/BU Ap-
proach (C & 
LS)* 
TD/BU Ap-
proach 
(LS)* 
Benchmark 
Values 
Integrated 
Approach* 
Top-Down 
Approach* 
 
  General Poverty Line 
39.34 16.67% 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% Headcount Index, P0
9.88 40.09% 28.48% 28.07% 28.42% Poverty Gap Index, P1
0.00 39.99% 29.42% 28.98% 29.36% Poverty Severity Index, P2
  Extreme Poverty Line 
4.92 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% Headcount Index, P0
0.96 3.34% 3.18% 3.04% 3.15% Poverty Gap Index, P1
0.00 -0.36% -0.34% -0.27% -0.34% Poverty Severity Index, P2
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
5.1. More on the TD/BU Approach 
 
In this subsection we want to investigate further what happens within the TD/BU approach in 
general, and in particular we will try to understand which is the main cause of the unusual de-
viation that is observed in the level of savings under the TD/BU-C&LS approach. 
At a first intuition, such a deviation could be generated either by a problem of initial data in-
consistency between the two datasets (the SAM and the survey), or by what we will refer to as 
“feedback effects” from the microeconomic level of analysis. With this concept we intend to 
incorporate all the effects that derive from a response (behavioural or not) of the agents in the 
MS model that is different from the one observed in the CGE model for the Representative 
Household (RH). This difference could be due either to a different way of modelling a particu-
lar behaviour in the two models (for instance, in the case of labour supply, the MS model uses 
a discrete and individualized concept of labour supply, while in the CGE model we have a 
continuous labour supply defined for the RH), or simply to the fact that in the MS model we 
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consider single households as the unit of modelling, while in the CGE model we have a 
unique RH (as for consumption and savings, for instance). 
In order to check whether the problem derives from an initial data inconsistency, we will run 
the same model using a new Social Accounting Matrix, which has been built in such a way 
that it is fully consistent with the data observed in the survey appropriately aggregated. As we 
can observe in Table 10, the variables that were adjusted to survey data are those in the grey 
cells, while all the other columns and rows were then rebalanced to obtain full consistency19. 
By comparing this SAM with the original one in Table 4, we can observe that in our case ini-
tial data inconsistencies were not very big (the biggest inconsistency is observed in the savings 
level). 
 
 
Table 10 – SAM of the Economy made consistent with the Household Survey 
C S S K L H G SI RoW TotalC 1 2 1 2
C1   57.8 15.6   95.4 62.6 28.1 23.6 283.0 
C2   17.1 23.5   313.2 48.8 13.6 76.6 492.8 
S 283.3          283.0 1
S  492.5         492.8 2
K   73.4 23.2    13.2   109.8 
L   81.7 353.8    117.5   552.6 
H     109.8 552.6  38.7   701.2 
G   12.3 17.7   250.8    280.8 
SI       41.7    41.7 
RoW   40.8 59.4       100.2 
Total 283.0 492.8 283.0 492.8 109.8 552.6 701.2 280.8 41.7 100.2  
 
Cq: consumption of good q; Sq: sector q; K: capital account; L: labour account; H: representative household ac-
count; G: public sector; SI: savings-investments account, RoW: Rest of the World account. 
 
 
 
With the SAM shown in Table 10, we will run the shock on the export price of sector 2 as be-
fore (-64%). Results are reported in Tables 11 and 12 for the TD/BU-C&LS (consumption and 
labour supply levels are reported from the MS model into the CGE model) and the TD/BU-LS 
(only labour supply is reported from the micro level) approaches. Observing the result for sav-
ings in the TD/BU-C&LS approach, we can see that in our case data inconsistencies were re-
sponsible only for a 2% change in the marginal propensity to save and in the savings level. 
This means that the remaining change of around 13% (the difference between the change ob-
                                                 
19 To rebalance the SAM a least square minimization method was used. 
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served in the other approaches, around 9%, and the one observed in this approach, 22.24%) is 
to be attributed to the feedback effects from the MS model. 
Observing the results for the TD/BU-LS approach we discover instead that the change in la-
bour supply that was observed after the first iteration (-1.32% instead of -1.18% of the first it-
eration) was due only to a problem of data inconsistency and not to feedback effects from the 
MS model. This means that modelling labour supply as a discrete choice and individually in 
the MS model does not affect the results of the macro model in a significant way, at least for 
what concerns our particular case. 
 
 
Table 11 – Simulation Results with Consistent Data: Percentage Changes 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply)  
0.00 0.00 Government Surplus 
-14.63 -14. 81 Wage Rate 
18.36 19.37 Capital return 
0.00 0.00 Consumer Price Index (num.) 
53.90 53.80 Exchange rate 
-1.18 -1.18 Labour Supply 
4.13 4.42 Government Use of Labour 
-24.89 -25.48 Government Use of Capital 
-9.45 -9.43 Income 
-9.45 -9.43 Disposable Income 
-8.14 -9.43 Consumption Expenditure 
-14.13 0.00 Marginal Propensity to Save 
-22.24 -9.43 Savings 
-9.57 -9.52 Tax Revenues 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Simulation Results with Consistent Data: Percentage Changes 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply)  
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2  
-1.44 0.44 -1.07 0.33 Commodity Prices 
-9.86 -12.06 -8.89 -12.55 Domestic Sales 
26.77 -13.80 27.65 -14.27 Domestic Production 
41.65 -12.85 43.17 -13.30 Labour Demand 
12.70 -25.99 13.05 -26.76 Capital Demand 
-7.13 -8.45 -8.45 -9.73 Consumption 
-21.11 -22.58 -8.45 -9.73 Investments 
-34.12 -47.30 -33.10 -47.63 Imports 
207.50 -78.34 207.46 -78.43 Exports 
 
 
 28
Once we have established that in the case of the TD/BU-C&LS approach most of the devia-
tion in the savings level (13% against a 2% due to data inconsistencies) is to be attributed to 
feedback effects coming from the micro level of analysis, we want now to understand which is 
the variable or the parameter that affects mostly this deviation. Intuitively, as we have already 
seen with the TD/BU-LS approach that the different way of modelling labour supply does not 
have big effects, then this deviation in the savings level must be due to the fact that in the MS 
model we have expenditure shares and tax parameters that are specific to every single house-
hold, while in the CGE model there is only one RH group with “average” shares and parame-
ters (in this sense ours is an extreme case, as we have only one RH in the CGE model). In or-
der to understand which is the parameter that particularly affects the deviation in the savings 
level, we run the MS model using for all the households the RH’s shares taken from the CGE 
model, instead of the shares and parameters that are observed in the survey for each house-
hold. The communicating variables from the MS model to the CGE model will remain the 
ones used in the TD/BU-C&LS approach, that is consumption levels and labour supply. Re-
sults in Table 13 clearly indicate that the main cause of difference between the two models is 
to be detected in the income tax rate, while labour supply and expenditure shares account only 
for a small part of it (the change in the savings level remains at 22% in these cases). When we 
use all the parameters from the CGE model (labour supply change, income tax rate, mps and 
consumption shares), the deviation in the savings level is almost reduced to zero, as it was to 
be expected. 
 
 
Table 13 – TD/BU-C&LS approach with consistent data: RH shares from CGE model used in the MS model 
(Percentage Changes, CGE Model Results) 
ΔLS, ty, 
mps & η
onlyonly ty only ΔLS ηI & mps I
2.92 -14.82 -14.47 0.12 Marginal propensity to save 
-6.78 -22.87 -22.55 -9.33 Savings 
 
 
These results are not surprising, as the income tax rate in the MS model is modelled in a way 
that is not linear with respect to the income level, as the rate depends on the income brackets 
to which household income belongs. Of course this feature is not captured at all in the CGE 
model, where we have a unique tax rate for the RH that is merely proportional to his income. 
Under the TD/BU-C&LS approach, while transmitting the consumption level from the MS to 
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the CGE model, we were implicitly transmitting a level of disposable (after tax) income that 
was incompatible with the one of the CGE model20. 
As a consequence of our modelling choices (made following Savard, 2003), all the effect of 
the mismatching between the disposable income levels of the two models is going into the 
change in the marginal propensity to save, then into the savings and investments levels as a 
consequence, but it was not transmitted in a significant way to the rest of the economy. In-
deed, if we observe the results in Tables 6 and 7, we would be tempted to say that, except for 
these big deviations in savings and investments levels (and a lower difference in the level of 
consumption), for the rest feedback effects do not appear to bring about significant differences 
in the results. This is even more evident once we have eliminated the effects coming from data 
inconsistencies (see Tables 11 and 12 compared with the columns for the Top-Down approach 
of Tables 6 and 7). 
21But the deviation in the savings level is quite big , even after having eliminated the problem 
of data inconsistency, and it allows us to believe that all the effects from the micro level of 
analysis are absorbed by the change in savings (and consequently of investments), and only in 
a very small part they are transmitted to the rest of the economy. Thus, a doubt arises: is con-
sumption in our case22 the right variable to pass the feedback effects onto the CGE model? 
And then, the choice of letting the marginal propensity to save free to vary in the CGE model 
was the best channel to transmit these feedback effects to the whole economy? 
Which is the parameter we have seen to be driving the biggest change between the micro and 
the macro level? It is income the tax rate, which is in our case the main determinant of dispos-
able income. So let us try to use this parameter (conveniently “aggregated” into a representa-
tive one), together with the change in aggregate labour supply, as communicating variable 
from the MS model to the CGE model. We will try to use not only the income tax rate from 
the MS model, but also the marginal propensity to save and the consumption shares. 
                                                 
20 In both our models, consumption and savings are simply modelled as fixed proportions of disposable income. 
21 In the paper by Savard (2003), where he analyses the case of Philippines using a TD/BU-C&LS approach, «… 
results of variation of this adjustment variable [the marginal propensity to save, n.d.a.] have shown to be rela-
tively small» (page 21). This probably means that the feedback effects in that case are not particularly important 
for the results of the model. 
22 We remember that in our case consumption is not modelled in a significantly different way in the two models. 
However, there could be other cases where the level of consumption can be an important carrier of feedback ef-
fects from the micro level of analysis. 
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Results are shown in Tables 14 and 15. As we can see by comparing these results with the 
ones in Table 6 and 7 for the Top-Down approach, feedback effects from the micro level of 
analysis can be important. In particular, in our case, we observe a different path for disposable 
income and tax revenues (due to the reduction of the income tax rate), and for savings and 
consumption, whose percentage changes are now closer to the ones of the MS model (see Ta-
ble 16). Anyway, full consistency between the CGE and the MS model results is only obtained 
when working with consistent data and when all the parameters (change in labour supply, tax 
rates, marginal propensity to save and consumption shares) are transmitted to the CGE model. 
However, if we report all these parameters from the MS model into the CGE model without 
having previously adjusted the data, we can see in Tables 14 and 15 that the problem of data 
inconsistency comes out again and distorts the results of the CGE model, and especially the 
level of savings (and that of investments as a direct consequence)23. 
 
Here we would like to focus also on another important fact: the Top-Down approach suffers 
not only from the problem of a lack of feedback effects from the micro level of analysis, but it 
is not even exempt from the problem of data inconsistency. Indeed, the fact that the results of 
the two models (the micro and the macro model) do not coincide, as it is in our case, could be 
due either to a problem of initial data inconsistency or to a different microeconomic behaviour 
of the agents in the MS model. In any case, one has to decide which results are the most reli-
able ones in the case they do not coincide. 
 
We report also results on income inequality and poverty changes after the simulation of the 
shock, for the three models described above (Tables 17 and 18). 
As we can see, no big differences are observed with respect to the results reported in Tables 8 
and 9. This means that, at least in our case, the fact of taking into account feedback effects 
does not have a strong influence on the results on income distribution and on poverty change. 
In any case, these values confirm once again the fact that the integrated approach tends to 
overestimate the effects of the shock on income inequality and poverty change, even though at 
the macro level we do not observe significant deviations in the main macroeconomic variables 
(see Tables 6 and 7). 
 
                                                 
23 Indeed, if we observe the two SAMs (Table 4 and Table 10, respectively), we can see that the level of savings 
is one of the biggest sources of data inconsistency between the SAM and the survey. 
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Table 14 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
ΔLS & ty (incon-
sistent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & η ΔLS, ty, mps & η
 
I 
(inconsistent data)
I 
(consistent data) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Government Surplus 
-14.70 -14. 62 -14.84 Wage Rate 
19.43 18.95 19.46 Capital return 
0.00 0.00 0.00 Consumer Price Index (num.) 
53.90 53.95 54.02 Exchange rate 
-1.18 -1.18 -1.18 Labour Supply 
2.26 2.13 1.62 Government Use of Labour 
-26.96 -26.69 -27.55 Government Use of Capital 
-9.39 -9.40 -9.44 Income 
-8.47 -8.48 -8.12 Disposable Income 
-8.47 -7.93 -8.14 Consumption Expenditure 
0.00 -5.53 0.25 Marginal Propensity to Save 
-8.47 -13.54 -7.89 Savings 
-10.95 -10.97 -11.60 Tax Revenues 
 
 
 
Table 15 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
ΔLS & ty (inconsis-
tent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & η ΔLS, ty, mps & η
 
I 
(inconsistent data) 
I 
(consistent data) 
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2  
-1.21 0.37 -1.38 0.42 -1.09 0.33 Commodity Prices 
-8.75 -12.00 -9.27 -11.77 -8.92 -11.73 Domestic Sales 
28.13 -13.75 27.72 -13.53 27.87 -13.42 Domestic Production 
43.37 -12.79 42.66 -12.58 43.46 -12.44 Labour Demand 
13.28 -26.30 13.11 -25.93 13.20 -26.07 Capital Demand 
-7.35 -8.81 -6.90 -8.24 -7.45 -8.35 Consumption 
-7.35 -8.81 -12.33 -13.91 -6.88 -8.19 Investments 
-33.09 -47.31 -33.57 -47.16 -33.20 -47.23 Imports 
210.17 -78.31 210.17 -78.27 208.79 -78.11 Exports 
 
 
 
Table 16 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (MS Model) 
TD  Approach (in-
consistent data) 
ΔLS & ty (inconsis-
tent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(consistent data)  
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2  
-7.23 -8.28 -7.45 -8.35 -7.21 -8.28 Consumption 
-7.78 -7.88 -7.78 Savings 
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Table 17 – Inequality Indices on Disposable per Adult Equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 ΔLS, ty, 
mps  & ηΔLS & ty (in-consistent 
data)* 
Benchmark 
Values 
I 
(consistent 
data)* 
33.96 1.63% 1.64% Gini Index 
9.60 2.76% 2.76% Atkinson’s Index, ε = 0.5 
71.80 2.31% 2.32% Coefficient of Variation 
   Generalized Entropy Measures: 
25.78 4.68% 4.68% I(c), c = 2 
19.93 2.08% 2.08% Mean Logarithmic Deviation, I(0) 
20.55 3.41% 3.42% Theil Coefficient, I(1) 
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
Table 18 – Poverty Indices on Disposable per Adult equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
ΔLS, ty, 
mps  & ηΔLS & ty (inconsis-
tent data)* 
Benchmark 
Values 
I 
(consistent 
data)*  
 General Poverty Line 
39.34 8.33% 8.33% Headcount Index, P0
9.88 28.54% 28.92% Poverty Gap Index, P1
0.00 29.49% 29.89% Poverty Severity Index, P2
 Extreme Poverty Line 
4.92 33.33% 33.33% Headcount Index, P0
0.96 3.20% 3.31% Poverty Gap Index, P1
0.00 -0.35% -0.34% Poverty Severity Index, P2
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we tried to give an assessment of the recent developments observed in methods 
that link together CGE and microsimulation models, with a special concern for the different 
linking approaches existing in the literature. Especially, we have focused our attention only on 
static models. By using data from a fictitious economy, we have built three models: one that 
follows the full integrated approach, as in Cockburn (2001); another one that follows the so 
called Top-Down approach, as it is developed in Bourguignon et al. (2003b), and the last one 
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that follows the method developed by Savard (2003), also known as Top-Down/Bottom-Up 
model. 
On one side we can say that a simple integrated approach like the one we have implemented in 
this paper is deficient on the side of the microeconomic specification and behavioural re-
sponses by individual agents. Anyway, the introduction of microeconometric behavioural 
equations into a CGE model looks of hard application and cumbersome for computational as-
pects. 
On the other side, a Top-Down approach completely disregards the possible feedback effects 
coming from the microeconomic side of the economy, which could affect also the macroeco-
nomic variables, as we have seen in subsection 5.1. 
In our opinion, indeed, the TD/BU modelling looks the most complete approach, as on one 
side it can include all the possible microeconometric estimates to account for behavioural re-
sponses by individual agents, and on the other side it also takes into account the feedback ef-
fects from the micro to the macro level of analysis. «…The value added of this approach 
comes from the fact that feedback effects, provided by the household model, do not corre-
spond to the aggregate behaviours of the representative households used in the CGE model» 
(Savard, 2003, page 20). 
However, two main problems arise when using this approach. First of all, the way in which 
these feedback effects are reported into the CGE model can affect results in a fundamental 
way. In particular, the fact of using shares or parameters instead of absolute levels (as in 
Savard’s approach, 2003, where consumption levels are used), when possible, seems to lead to 
more consistent results, especially for the fact that when transmitting absolute levels from the 
MS model one has to change the initial hypothesis of the CGE model (see section 4). Sec-
ondly, eventual data inconsistencies between the micro and the macro datasets can also affect 
results seriously, and this can be overcome only by adjusting either one or the other dataset, 
thus going back to the problem of data reconciliation encountered with the integrated model 
(see section 2). However, while with an integrated model we encounter this problem when 
building the model, when we run a TD/BU model without previously adjusting the data, we 
have the problem of data inconsistencies that enters the results and we are not able to distin-
guish which is the part of the change that is due to feedback effects and which is the part due 
to data inconsistencies. 
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Appendix A – Equations for the CGE Model 
 
CBUDHCP qqq ⋅=⋅ α                                    q = 1,2 C.1 Demand for consumption goods 
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 C.6 CES production function 
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 C.7 CES FOC for capital 
SIIP qqq ⋅=⋅ α  Demand for commodity q as investment good C.8 
( ) ERPWMtmPM qqq ⋅⋅+= 1  C.9 Price of imports in local currency 
ERPWEPE qq ⋅=  C.10 Price of exports in local currency 
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 C.11 Armington function 
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 C.12 Armington FOC for imports 
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 C.13 CET function 
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 C.14 CET FOC for exports 
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 C.15 Market clearing condition for labour 
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 C.16 Market clearing condition for capital 
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 C.17 Market clearing condition for commodity q 
PCTFLSPLKSPKY ⋅+⋅+⋅= C.18 Income definition  
( ) SYtyCBUD −⋅−= 1 C.19 Disposable income minus savings  
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 C.20 Zero profit condition in production function 
qqqqqq XDDPDDMPMXP ⋅+⋅=⋅  C.21 Zero profit condition in Armington function 
qqqqqq XDDPDDEPEXDPD ⋅+⋅=⋅  C.22 Zero profit condition in CET function 
( )PCTFTAXREVCGCGP qqq ⋅−⋅=⋅ α  Demand of commodity q by government C.23 
( )PCTFTAXREVKGKGPK ⋅−⋅=⋅ α C.24 Demand of capital by government  
( )PCTFTAXREVLGLGPL ⋅−⋅=⋅ α C.25 Demand of labour by government  
( )∑
=
⋅⋅+⋅=
2
1q
qq ERPWMtmYtyTAXREV  C.26 Tax revenues 
   
Exogenous variables: Number of variables: 49 - capital endowment (KS) Number of equations: 41 - time endowment (TS) Number of exogenous variables: 8 - public transfers (TF) Walras’ law satisfied - world prices (PWEq and PWMq) Model homogeneous of degree one - Numeraire: consumer price index (PC) 
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Variables: 
PDDPK         return to capital q          price of domestic production delivered to domestic market 
XDDPL         wage rate q          domestic production delivered to domestic markets 
PWEPq          Armington composite good price q          export prices in foreign currency (exogenous) 
PWMPDq       output price q         import prices in foreign currency (exogenous) 
TAXREV      tax revenue PMq       import prices in local currency 
 PEq        export prices in local currency 
Parameters: ER         exchange rate (numeraire) 
ty              direct income tax rate PC         consumer price index 
tmKS         capital endowment (exogenous) q             tariff rate on imports 
mps          RH’s marginal propensity to save LS         labour supply (endogenous) 
io              technical coefficients TS         time endowment (exogenous) qs
Xq          domestic sales-Armington composite 
XDq       domestic output 
Mq         imports 
Eq          exports 
Kq         capital demand by firms 
KG        capital demand by government 
Lq          labour demand by firms 
LG        labour demand by government 
Iq           demand for investment goods 
Cq          demand for consumption goods 
Cl          demand for leisure 
CGq       government commodity demand 
Y            RH's income 
S            RH's savings 
CBUD   RH's disposable income 
TF         public transfers to RH (exogenous) 
 
aFq            efficiency parameter of firm q’s production function γFq            share parameter in CES production function σFq            elasticity of substitution in CES production function 
αHq           C-D power of commodity q in RH’s utility function 
αH            C-D power of leisure in RH’s utility function l
αIq             C-D power of good q in Bank’s utility function 
αCGq         C-D power of commodity q in gov.’s utility function 
αKG          C-D power of capital in government’s utility function 
αLG          C-D power of labour in government’s utility function 
aAq             efficiency parameter in Armington function γAq             share parameter in Armington function σAq            elasticity of substitution in Armington function 
aTq             efficiency parameter in CET function γTq            distribution parameter in CET function σTq            elasticity of transformation in CET function ε_LS         wage elasticity of labour supply 
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Appendix B – Inequality and Poverty Indices 
 
Here, we will give details of some inequality and poverty measures used during the analysis. 
 
Gini index 
The Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly used indicators of income inequality. It is 
defined as: 
∑∑ −=
i j
ij yyN
G 22
1
μ  
where μ is the arithmetical mean of the incomes, N is the size of the population, and  and 
 are the incomes of agents i and j, respectively. Thus, the second factor at the right hand 
side represents the sum of the differences (in modulus) computed over all pairs of incomes. In 
the literature, however, we can also find different (although equivalent) definitions. In particu-
lar, it can be derived from the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative share of total income 
earned by households ranked from bottom to top (see below), in the following way: 
iy
jy
∫−= 1
0
)(21 dppLG ,            (A.1) 
where L(p) is the Lorenz curve. The previous formula thus measures the area that is laying be-
tween the curve and the diagonal as a fraction of the total area under the 45° line. In terms of 
Figure A.1 below, this means: 
BB
BA
AG 21
2
1
2
1 −=−=+= . 
If the Lorenz curve coincides with the 45° line, which represents the situation of perfect equal-
ity, then the integral in equation (A.1) will take the value of ½, and the Gini index will equal 
zero. 
The Gini index can thus take values between zero (perfect equality) and one (maximum level 
of inequality, that is, when all the income in the economy is owned by only one individual: 
Ny μ=max ). Thus, the smaller is the index, the smaller is the inequality in the economy. 
The Gini index is very useful because it allows the ordering of different income distributions 
according to their level of inequality. 
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Figure A.1 – Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
Atkinson’s index 
Atkinson’s index is one of the few inequality measures that explicitly incorporate normative 
judgments about social welfare (Atkinson, 1970). The index is derived by calculating the so-
called equity-sensitive average income ( ), which is defined as that level of per capita in-
come which if enjoyed by everybody would make total welfare exactly equal to the total wel-
fare generated by the actual income distribution. It is sometimes also called equally distributed 
equivalent income. It is given by: 
ey
( ) ( )eN
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e
y
N
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=
−
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⎛⋅= ∑
1/1
1
1
1
μ , 
where  is the proportion of total income received by individual i, and e is the so-called ine-
quality aversion parameter, which measures the degree of society’s inequality aversion. It in-
deed reflects the strength of society's preference for equality, and can take values ranging from 
zero to infinity. When e > 0, there is a social preference for equality (or an aversion to ine-
quality). As e rises, society attaches more weight to income transfers at the lower end of the 
iy
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distribution and less weight to transfers at the top. e → 0 implies neutrality with respect to 
inequality, so that inequality is not perceived as a problem. Suppose instead that e → ∞, then 
it means that there are Rawlsian preferences in the society, that is, that individuals have a 
preference for perfect equality. Typically, in the literature the most common values that are 
used for e include 0.5 and 2. 
The Atkinson index ( ) is then given by: eI
μ
e
e
y
I −= 1 , 
where µ is the actual mean income. The more equal the income distribution is, the closer  
will be to µ, and the lower the value of the Atkinson index. For any income distribution, the 
value of  lies between 0 and 1. 
ey
eI
 
 
Coefficient of variation 
The coefficient of variation is a measure of the dispersion of data around the mean. It is de-
fined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, that is: 
μ
σ=CV . 
The coefficient of variation is a dimensionless number that allows comparison of the variation 
of populations that have significantly different mean values. It is often reported as a 
percentage (%) by multiplying the above calculation by 100. 
 
 
Generalized Entropy Coefficients 
The family of Generalized Entropy indices satisfies a desirable property for inequality indices, 
that is, all the indices belonging to this family can be decomposed into a within-group and a 
between group contribution. The formulas for the indices are: 
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ln1)1( μμ  for c = 1 Theil coefficient: 
 
Parameter c reflects different perceptions of inequality, with lower values indicating a higher 
degree of inequality aversion. A value of c greater than one means that differences at the 
higher end of the welfare distribution are assigned more importance than those at the lower 
end. 
For the second index, known as Mean Logarithmic Deviation, a value of zero represents per-
fect equality and higher values denote increasing levels of inequality, within a given adminis-
trative unit. The parameter value 0 means that differences at the low end of the welfare distri-
bution are assigned more importance than those at the high end. 
Finally, Theil coefficient (or "information theory" measure) has a potential range from zero to 
infinity, with higher values (greater entropy) indicating more unequal distribution of income. 
If instead everyone has the same (i.e., mean) income, then the index equals 0. If one person 
has all the income, then the index is equal to ln(N). The parameter value 1 means that differ-
ences are equivalently treated at all points in the welfare distribution. 
The Theil index has the advantage of being additive across different subgroups or regions in 
the country. Indeed, it is the weighted sum of inequality within subgroups. For example, ine-
quality within the United States is the sum of each state's inequality weighted by the state's in-
come relative to the entire country. 
If the population is divided into m certain subgroups and sk is the income share of group k, Tk 
is the Theil index for that subgroup, and μk is the average income in group k, then the Theil in-
dex of the population is: 
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kk sTsT
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. 
Therefore, one can say that a certain group "contributes" a certain amount of inequality to the 
whole. 
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Poverty Indices 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) have suggested a useful class of poverty indices that takes 
the following form: 
( )∑
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1
α
α , 
where Z  denotes the poverty line, Yp i the expenditure or income of the i-th poor household (or 
individual), N the total number of households and q the number of households whose expendi-
tures or incomes are below the poverty line. Of course, the choice of the poverty line is of 
great importance in the determination of the index, and it may reflect different judgements 
about the researcher’s choice for an appropriate level of welfare. 
From the general formula above, one can compute different kinds of poverty measures by 
simply varying the value of α: 
N
qP =0• If α = 0 ⇒  
P0 is also called “Headcount ratio”, as it measures the incidence of poverty as the proportion 
of total population lying below the poverty line. 
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1• If α = 1 ⇒  
This index gives a good measure of the intensity of poverty, as it reflects how far the poor are 
from the poverty line. Indeed, it quantifies the extent to which the income of the poor lays be-
low the poverty line. Hence the reason why it is also called “Income or Poverty gap ratio”. 
( )∑
= ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⋅=
q
i p
ip
Z
YZ
N
P
1
2
2
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This measure is also known as “Poverty Severity Index”, as it gives an indication of the de-
gree of inequality among the poor. The greater is the inequality of distribution among the poor 
and thus the severity of poverty, the higher is P . 2
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